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ESCROWS
Rice, P. J., adopts' as a definition of an escrow, the
following language of 16 Cyclopedia of Law and Pro-
cedure, p. 561, "An escrow is a written instrument
which by its terms imports a legal obligation, deposited
by the grantor, promisor or obligor or his agent, with
a stranger or third person, that is, a person not a party
to the instrument, such as the grantee, promisee or ob-
l'gee, to be kept by the depositary until the performance
of a condition or the happening of a certain event, and
then to be delivered over to take effect." A definition
quoted by Trunkey, J.,2 is "The delivery of a deed as
an escrow is said to be when one doth make and seal
a deed and deliver it unto a stranger until certain con-
ditions be performed, and then be delivered to him to
whom the deed is made, to take effect as his deed. And
so a man may deliver a deed, and such delivery is
good." The former definition states that the escrow
"imports a legal obligation." Some escrows do; e. g.
bonds, promissory notes. But a conveyance does not,
2Murphy v. Greybill, 34 Super. 539.
2Baum'a Appeal, 113 Pa. 58.
Dickinson Law Review
by its terms import an obligation. There may be an
obligation to convey, arising out of some previous con-
tract, but the conveyance does not express or impart
this obligation. It is rather the performance, the ex-
tinction of the obligation. Perhaps there has been no
previous duty to convey. Then the deed does not im-
port even the extinction of an obligation. A my grat-
uitously and without B's knowledge, make to B a deed
in fee of land, and deposit it with C until A dies, or un-
til B reaches the age of thirty years, when he, C, is to
deliver it to B. Nothing is to be done by A, by the
terms of the paper. His duty towards B is, like that
of any other human being, that of respecting the pro-
perty rights of B, a duty not expressed, not imported,
by the deed.
Instruments Which May Be Escrows
Deeds which purport to convey interests in land,
are the usual specimens of escrows. The sheriff, sell-
ing land in execution, may deposit the deed with an-
other than the purchaser.3  The ordinary vendor of
land may make the deed an escrow.4 A gratuitous con-
veyance, e. g. of husband to wife,5 of grandfather to
grand-children,6 may be deposited with another till the
grantor's death. An assignment of a patentj or of a
bond and mortgage,8 may be an escrow. A, purchasing
land from B, may execute a bond to B, for the purchase
money of land, putting it into the custody of C, to be
3Robbins v. Bellas, 2 W. 359.
4Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. 58.
5Levengood v. Bailey, 1 Woodw. 275.
6Stephens v. Hess, 54 Pa. 20.; Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa.
434.
7McMillan v. Davis, 54 Super. 154.
SBooth v. Williams, 2 W. N. 504; 11 Phia. 266.
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retained until certain incumbrances shall have been dis-
charged, and then to be delivered to B.P
Grantee Cannot Be The Depositary
"An instrument, complete on its face for the con-
veyance of land, cannot be deposited with the grantee
as an escrow; such deposit becomes a delivery, and the
instrument so delivered becomes a deed, which takes
effect presently as the deed of the party making the
delivery, regardless of the oral conditions attached,
which the party will not be bound to perform.'"" There
raight be justification for the rule that if A put a deed
absolute in its purport, in the hands of B, the grantee,
and B, thus in possession of it, dealt with the land
named in the deed as his, so that another, who had in-
ferred from his possession that he was the owner, would
be injured if A were allowed to deny B's ownership, by
showing that the delivery of the deed to him was to
operate only on a condition, the delivery to B should, in
the interest of the person bona fide dealing with him,
as owner, be treated as absolute. A is indebted to sev-
eral, on a recognizance in the Orphans' Court, for pro-
perty taken in partition. Certain of the heirs entitled
under their recognizance, released A. In a distribution
of A's estate, after his death, among creditors, the re-
leasors will not be permitted to claim against the other
creditors, that the release was not to operate, unless the
releasee, A, should pay the amounts owed by him on
the recoghizance. To allow this claim "would not only
be putting it in the power of the party in whose favor
the deed (release) is made, to practice a fraud upon
the community by means of it, in obtaining a credit
that otherwise would not be given to him, but would be
9Beaumont v. Kline, 3 Phila, 44.
1016 Cyc. 571.
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opening a wide door for the introduction of frauds and
perjuries.", But, when the grantee's assertion that he
was the owner, would be a violation of the understand-
ing that he was only to become the owner on the doing
of a certain act, or the happening of a certain event, the
only reason for refusing to allow proof of this under-
standing would be that which denies the right of a par-
ty to alter or contradict a writing by parol. If the
grantee admitted in writing that he had received the
deed as an ascrow, this reason would be inapplicable.
Who May Be Depositaries
It may be said generally that anybody may be
niade the depositary of an escrow. The father of the
grantee was such. 12  The sheriff having sold the
land on an execution, may deposit the deed with the
prothonotary, who is to deliver to the vendee only on
his paying the purchase money. 8  A corporation may
be the depositary;" e. g., a national bank.15 A father, in-
tend!ng to convey to his son, may deposit the deed with
his wife, the son's mother, until the grantor's death,
and the payment by the son of all the father's debts.15
The justice of the peace, who takes the acknowledgment
of the deed, may be the depositary. 17 The grantor who
"Kennedy, J., Simonton's Estate, 4 W. 180: The justice sur-
mises that the release was made to help the releasee to convince
others that his land was discharged of the recognizance. To al-
low the releaser to claim against other creditors who had possi-
bly been induced to give credit, would be unjust to them.
1"Ecknan v. Eckman, 55 Pa. 269.
URobbins v. Bellas, 2 W. 359.
1"Dempwolf v. Graybill, 213 Pa. 163; Murphy v. Graybill, 34
Super. 339; Gochnarer v. Union Trust Co., 225 Pa. 503.
15McMillan v. Davis, 54 Super. 154.
"6Landon v. Brown, 160 Pa. 538.
lTLevengood v. Bailey, 1 Woodw. 275.
Dickinson Law Review
makes a will, when making the deed, may deposit the lat-
ter with the person whom he has named as executor,
with direction to deliver it to the grantee on his pay-
ment of the purchase money, $1,000.18 The grantor
may select his own attorney to hold the deed.19  A
mortgagor negot'ating for an assignment of the mort-
gage to his wife, may direct it to be deposited with
his attorney until he pays for it.
2
0
Nature of The Determining Event
The object of making an escrow is to suspend the
right to possession or the ownership, upon the occur-
rence of some event. The event may be contingent.
its happening at all may be uncertain. It may be cer-
tain to happen, the time of its occurrence only, being un-
known.
Event Contingent
Various events may be selected as conditions pre-
cedent to the vesting of ownership and of the right
to the possession of the deed. The event may be the
payment of a definite purchase money,21 of a designated
purchase money, and certain shares of stock,22 of a
series of notes given for the purchase money,2 3 of the
28Smith's Estate, 6 Kulp. 76.
19Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. 58.
2OBooth v. Williams, 2 W. N. 504.
21Robins v. Bellas, 2 W. 359; Pace v. Yost, 10 Kulp. 538; Vor-
heis v. Kitch, 8 Phila. 554.
22Murphey v. Greybill, 34 Super. 339; Dempwolf v. Greybill,
213 Pa. 163.
23McMil~en v. Davis, 54 Super. 154.
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grantor's debts.2 4 The event may be the painting and
glazing of thirty-two houses, by the grantee.
2 5
Events Certain
The death of some person may be the event upon
which the grantor intends the right to the possession
of the deed to pass to the grantee. Usually 'it is the
death of the grantor himself. He intends to pass an
estate which shall entitle to possession not before but
immediately upon his own death. The estate intended
to pass is usually a fee. It might be less. The motive
for making the conveyance in the form of an escrow,
is to retain the possession and ownership of the land,
for the grantor's life. This could be done by making
a will instead of a deed, but, were a will used, there
would be a risk of the acquisition of interests which would
minify that intended to pass. Should the donor marry,
before death, his wife might insist on dower.' In sev-
eral cases, the intention to prevent the attachment of
dower or curtesy is manifest. A grandfather, about to
remarry, conveyed land to his grand-children, but de-
posited the deed with a third person to keep until his
death, and then to put it on record and deliver it to the
grantees..2 8  A childless husband conveyed to his wife,
but deposited the deed with X to be held until his death.
27
There may be no allusion in the mind of the grantor, to
the avoidance of delivery, etc., the sole purpose of depos-
iting the deed being to retain for the grantor, an own-
ership for his life.28 An uncle made a deed which re-
24Landon v. Brown, 160 Pa. 538.
25Beam v. Curran, 2 W. N. 260.
20Stephens v. Huss, 54 Pa. 20; Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa.
434.
2 7Levengood v. Bailey, 1 Woodw. 275.
2SWerley v. Werley, 2 Leh. 343.
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served a life estate, and subject thereto, conveyed to his
nephews the fee, and deposited it to be delivered to them
at his death.29
Several Events, Contingent and Certain
It is possible to suspend the grantor's right to the
possession of the deed and of the land upon several
events; e. g., the deed may be deposited to be delivered
on the death of the grantor, and the payment of the
designated purchase money.30
Several Grantors, Obligors, Etc.
A bond, deed, recognizance, etc., may be intended
not only by the obligee, grantee, etc., but by each of the
several obligors, grantors, etc., to be executed by the
whole of them. Suit on a bond to indemnify persons
who become sureties on a sheriff's bond. The defense
was that the sureties to be indemnified, by their agent
agreed that a certain number of indemnitors should be
procured, and that some of this number had not been
obtained. When the defendants signed and delivered
the bond, they did so on the condition that the required
number of signers should be obtained. The delivery by
each signer was not absolute, but on this condition.
There could be no recovery against the signers.3 1 A
principal and two sureties were named in a bond as obli-
gors. The statute under which it was given, required two
sureties. One who signed such a bond (one of the two sur-
eties named) had a right to assume that the signature of
the other surety would be procured. If it was not pro-
cured, he is not liable.32 Several devisees in remainder
29Eckman v. Eckman, 55 Pa. 269.
aoSmith's Estate, 6 Kulp. 76.
OFertig v. Bucher, 3 Pa. 308.
S2Sharp v. United States, 4 W. 21.
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after a life estate. They are applied to to re-
lease their interests as devisees, for the purpose of avoid-
ing a contest over the will. Some of them
execute the release, which the others subsequently de-
cline to sign. The delivery of those who sign is to
be considered as conditioned on the signing by all and if
all do not sign, those who do are not bound.
33
Depositary's Duty, How Expressed
The grantor, when he deposits the deed with an-
other than the grantee may orally express the duty of
the depositary, to make delivery. This oral expression
may be proved as other facts. A sheriff's deed was
left in the prothonotary's office. On it was written
"19th January, 1819, acknowledged, George W. Brown,
Prothonotary." "Deposited as an escrow." There
was evidence that the sheriff's vendee had desired him
to deliver the deed, on his giving a receipt of payment
of a later judgment than that on which the sale had
been made, and that the sheriff, declining to deliver the
deed, deposited it with the prothonotary until payment
by the vendee should be made.34 Evidence of the condi-
tion upon which the deed was to be delivered to the de-
positary was, in part, in a will of the grantor, in which
he mentions the conveyance and states that it is to be de-
livered, after his death, and only on the grantee's pay-
ing all his debts.3 5  The grantor's deed, the grantee's
agreement to pay $15,000, and his bond for that
amount, were put into an envelope and left with a de-
positary until the death of the grantor. The facts
were orally proved.3 6  The terms on which the deed
33Donnelly v. Rafferty, 172 Pa. 587.
3,Robins v. Bellas, 2 W. 359.
SSLandon v. Brown, 160 Pa. 538.
8Gish v. Brown, 171 4. 479.
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is to be delivered may be written by the grantor. The
depositary may by writing state what his duty is con-
cerning delivery; e. g., "This deed was left with me by
Jacob S. Beam, in escrow, to be delivered to S. S. Kelly,
when Charles C. Carman delivers his deed to Jacob S.
Beam." J. S. Yardley.31 In Gochenauer v. Union Trust
Co.,38 the Trust Company executed this paper, on re-
ceiving the deed: "Received of George C. Gochenauer,
depositor, deed dated March 25, 1901, from George C.
Gochnauer and wife to Joseph C. Murphy for property
situated in Monroe Township, Cumberland County, Pa.,
to be held in escrow under terms of agreement dated
February the 28th, 1901, between the depositor and
Newton Jackson. (signed) The Union Trust Company."
The vendor of land may give a written option to X to
buy it at a fixed price, in money and stock, and may
therein stipulate, "the deed to the property to be de-
posited in escrow with the Union Trust Company of
Philadelphia, on or before March 15, 1901, and upon
delivery by the said Newton Jackson (the grantee) of
the consideration named above, said deed shall be re-
corded * * * and become the property of said Newton
Jackson or company."' 3 If the condition precedent be
expressed in writing, the construction of the writing is
for the Court. Though strict compliance with the
condition precedent to delivery is required of the de-
posifary, no strained construction is put on the words
used. Where the words can be interpreted as a con-
dition, a reservation or a covenant, the Court favors the
finding of a covenant.
3TBeam v. Carman, 2 W. N. 260.
3S225 Pa. 503.
S9Murphey v. Greybill, 34 Super. 339.
IMurphey v. Greybill, 34 Super. 339; Dempwolf v. Greybill,
213 Pa. 163.
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Grantee's Failure to Comply With Condition and Ac-
cept Deed
If the grantee refuses to comply with the condition,
e. g., to pay the specified purchase money, after the
grantor's death, the deed is deemed not to have effect,
and the grantor dies the owner of the land. 2
When Deed Is Improperly Delivered
If the grantee obtains the deed, from the depositary
without complying with the condition, he obtains only
a voidable title.3  Among "recognized and settled prin-
ciples of law," Elkin, J., mentions these; the grantee in
a deed placed as an escrow, is entitled to the possession
of it only upon a strict compliance with the conditions
precedent to such delivery; if the depositary delivers the
deed without authority of the grantor; if the grantee ob-
tains possession fraudulently, not performing the condi-
tion, the deed is void; if the future delivery of the deed
depends on the payment of money or the performance
of some other condition, and the grantee obtains posses-
sion of the deed without performing the condition, he ac-
quires but a voidable title.4  Apparently a void deed and
a voidable title are conceived to be synonymous. The
sheriff having sold land to X, and deposited the deed
with the prothonotary to deliver only on the payment
of the purchase money, X, some years afterwards ob-
tained an order, of the Court for the delivery of the deed
without requiring him to pay. The Court had no
power to make this order, and the plaintiff in the execu-
tion on which the sale was made, and who had failed to
obtain satisfaction of his debt, by the refusal of X to
2Smith's Estate, 6 Kulp. 76.
sLatidon v. Brown, 160 Pa. 538; Dempwolf v. Greybill, 213
Pa. 163; Murphey v. Greybill, 34 Super. 339.
4Dempwolf v. Greybill, 213 Pa. 163.
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pay his bid, might issue an alias writ, and cause a sec-
ond sale of the land.5  The voidness of the delivery of
the sheriff's deed did not need to be decided by any
Court. The plaintiff in the execution assumed it, in is-
suing the second execution. In Booth v. Williams,6 an
assignment by an obligee and mortgagee, of the bond
and mortgage, to the wife of the mortgagor, was put
in escrow, until the payment of the price agreed upon.
The judgment which had been entered on the war-
rant of attorney in the bond, was for some reason not
assigned. After default in paying some of the price, the
mortgagee threatened to enforce the mortgage for the
whole of the original debt, although he had received
$4,000. The depositary then delivered the bond and
mortgage to the assignee. The mortgagee then at-
tempted to have execution of the judgment. The
Court, Mitchell, J., enjoined against the execution, say-
ing that the validity of the assignment could not be
contested without making the assignee, the wife of the
mortgagee, a party, but refraining from passing on the
effect of the delivery of the mortgage and bond.
Judicial Avoidance of Deed
A deed in escrow, having been, in violation of the
terms of the deposit put on record, by the grantee, the
grantor may, by bill in equity, obtain a decree for the
cancellation of the deed and of the record of it.7
Estoppel To Deny Fulfilment of Condition
The party in whose favor the condition operates may
preclude himself from insisting upon it; e. g., by him-
5Robins v. Bellas, 2 W. 357.
62 W. N. 504.
7Eckman v. Eckman, 55 Pa. 269. The Court however found
that the deed had been delivered absolutely.
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self doing that which the other party was to do. A,
vendee of land on which were encumbrances, gave a bond
for the purchase money, placing it in the custody of X,
until these incumbrances should be removed. The ven-
dee afterwards himself removed these incumbrances, by
paying money less in amount than the bond. But the
bond does not become void, as not having been delivered.
On the contrary, the vendee's making impossible the do-
ing of the act stipulated for, the bond will be treated
as if delivered to the obligee, and a recovery on it will
be allowed, deducting what the obligor has paid., If the
grantor so acts as to induce the depositary and others to
9uppose that the condition on which the deed is to be
dellvered has been fulfilled, and the grantee, as he knows,
obtains it. and nwakes a mortgage on the premises to
X. he will be precluded, as respects X and the purchaser
at the foreclosure sale from denying that the terms of,
the deposit had been complied with. In ejectment by
this purchaser against the grantor, the latter cannot al-
lege that the grantee did not own the land and therefore
could not validly mortgage it.9
Conditioning After Absolute Delivery
If a deed is delivered to the grantee, it cannot by a
later act of the grantor only, (possibly not by the conse-
quent act of grantor and grantee) be turned into an es-
crow. Says Rogers, J., "it is unquestionable law that
a deed cannot be made an escrow by any other declara-
tions than are made at the time of signing and execut-
ing the instrument." A deed signed, sealed, acknowl-
edged, and deposited with a third person to be handed
to the grantee, cannot the next day be converted into
SBeaumont v. Kline, 3 Phila. 44.
9Dempwolf v. Greybill, 213 Pa. 163.
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an escrow by a direction to the third person to deliver
it only when the purchase money is paid.-
Minifying The Condition
After an escrow is made, the conditions may be
softened by the act of the grantor. The original terms
may, e. g., require that the deed be retained until, with-
in ten days payment of the purchase money be made,
and the grantor may orally consent to a delay beyond
the ten days, of the payment, and so prevent his with-
drawing the deed from the depositary, before the expi-
ration of the prolonged period, or his hindering the
grantee's getting it, on tendering the payment within the
extended time.1 A deposits a deed with X with di-
rection to deliver it after A's death to B, on B's paying
a bond for $15,000. Subsequently, A writes on the
back of the bond, "This obligation is hereby cancelled
and made null and void for a valuable consideration to
me in hand paid," by the grantee and signs the endorse-
ment. He thus releases the grantee from the necessity
of paying the $15,000, in order to entitle him to the land
and the deed. On obtaining the deed without such pay-
ment, he could recover the land in ejectment.1 2 A agrees
to convey two houses to B, as soon as B has finished the
painting and glazing of 32 houses, in process of erection
by A. The deed is put in escrow until the finishing of
the painting and glazing. Subsequently B agrees to
sell one of the two houses to C, and A, in pursuance of
this agreement makes a deed for it to B, and at the
same time, B makes a deed for it to C. Both these deeds
loBlight v. Schenclr, 10 Da. 285; Antrimn's Est. 16 Luz. 59.
Cf. Eckman v. Eckman, 55 Pa. 269.
llBaum's Appeal, 113 Pa, 58. The Court decreed that the
deed be delivered.
12Gish v. Brown, 171 Pa. 479,
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are deposited with X, "until B shall have done sufficient
painting and glazing * * * to warrant A to deliver the
deed. By agreeing to this modification of the condition
A waives his right to postpone the delivery of the deed
until the painting and glazing of the 32 houses are com-
pleted.13
Deed Ultimately Delivered Without Compliance With
Condition
A made A deed to his son, depositing it with his
wife, to hand to the son, after A's death, uponthe son's
paying all of A's debts. There were judgments binding
the land. The wife delivered the deed to the son after
A's death, although he had not paid these judgments.
The land was sold on one of these judgments. Whether
it was entitled to the proceeds against the owner of a
much younger judgment recorded against the son, de-
pended on the question whether the earlier judgment's
lien had been maintained by renewals. The Court held
that, if the land was the son's, as devisee or as heir,
the earlier judgment preserved its lien without revival,
but if he became owner as grantee, a revival was nec-
essary. It found that he owned the land as grantee,
14
but by a voidable title. If a sale of land is made,
and the deed deposited with X, to be delivered to the
purchaser only upon his paying the purchase money,
and X allows the deed to be received by the grantee,
who gets possession of the land, the grantor may doubt-
less recover the land from him in ejectment. The
grantee however may convey the land to another, un-
der such circumstances as would warrant his purchaser
to believe that he was in legitimate possession of the
lUBaum v. Carman, 2 W. N. 260. As owner B to the use of
C, could recover in ejectment.
ILandon v. Brown, 160 . 538.'
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deed. In such a case, the original grantor could not
recover the land from his grantee's grantee. A causes
a scrivener to prepare a deed to B. He is notified that
the deed is at an alderman's office, ready for execution.
He calls at the office, executes and acknowledges the
deed, to have been signed, sealed and delivered by him.
The deed is left with the alderman, and the scrivener
procures it under instructions not to deliver it until the
purchase money is paid. It is however delivered with-
out payment, and possession of the land is also taken
by the grantee. A bona fide purchaser from him, will
get a good title. "He invests his money on the faith of
the solemn acts and declarations of the plaintiff," the
grantor.15
Liability of Depositary For Improper Delivery
Probably the depositary who delivers the deed be-
fore the conditions upon which he was to deliver it have
been fulfilled, will be liable to the grantor for any result-
ing damage, in the action of assumpsit.16 An explicit
denial of the allegations that the terms upon which de-
livery was to be made have been violated will prevent
judgment before trial.17 Even if the delivery of the deed
has been made before compliance with the conditions,
the grantor may preclude himself from recovering dam-
ages from the depositary. If after the delivery, and with
knowledge that it should not have been made, the gran-
tor obtains the benefit which he has no right to, unless
and until the conveyance has been made, he cannot even
as. against the depositary of the deed, deny the rightness
of the delivery. A sells to a milling company his mill.
25Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. 285; Demnpwolf v. Greybill, 213
Pa. 163.
l6Gochnauer v. Union Trust Co., 225 Pa. 503.
1?Gochnauer v. Union Trust Co., 214 PA, 177.
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The deed is put in escrow until the consideration, pre-
ferred stock, whose par is $10,500 and common stock of
the same par value. The company is to buy the grain,
flour and feed on hand at the time of the transfer. A.
month after the delivery to him of the stock, and the
reception by the company of the deed from the deposi-
tary, the grantor transferred his grain, flour and feed,
receiving the price. He thus, says Brown, J., "reaffirm-
ed the agreement under which the deed had passed, and
tacitly approved all that had been done."'
Enforcement of Right Against the Grantor
If the grantor refuses improperly to allow per-
formance of the condition by the grantee, and to allow
the depositary to deliver the deed, the Court will, on bill
in equity, decree that the grantor and the depositary de.
liver the deed in a specified time to the grantee.19 The
grantee may recover the land in ejectment if he has per-
formed the condition on which he was entitled to the
deed, although the deed has been improperly withheld.
Sale Not An Option
If an agreement is made by which A undertakes to
sell an assignment of a patent to B, B giving notes for
the price, the fact that the agreement (but not the
notes) is put in the hands of a third person to keep until
1 8Goecnauer v. Union Trust Co., 225 Pa. 503. The approval
was very "tacit."
I9Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. 58. Here the vendee under a con-
tract to sell and buy land had paid the purchase money to the
depositary, who kept it but refused to deliver the deed. The
grantor alleged that by not paying the money in the time specified
by the contract, the grantee had lost all right to the land. The
Superior Court refused to find that only a proposition to sell
had been made, which the vendor might withdraw.
20Beam v. Carman, 2 W. N, 260,
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the payment of the notes, and then to deliver it, does not
make merely an option in B to take or not. A can either
recall the 'assignment, if the notes are not
paid, or he may maintain assumpsit upon them.21
Doctrine of Relation
If A contracts to sell land to B, the deed to be depos-
ited with another, till payment of the purchase money,
the interest of the vendee, on his subsequently paying
the money, and receiving the deed, will be what it would
have been, had the deed been delivered directly to him,
instead of the depositary. This fact is sometimes ex-
pressed by saying that the second delivery takes effect
by relation to the first delivery. "When a feme sole,"
says Trunkey, J., "delivers a deed as an escrow, and mar-
ries before it ceases to be an escrow by second delivery,
the relation back to time of first delivery becomes neces-
sary to render the deed valid."123 A deposited a deed to
his son B, and put it in the hands of C, to be delivered to
B after A's death. Apparently the understanding was
that B was to pay certain sums of money, besides a bond
for $15,000. Subsequently, the bond was marked can-
celled by A. After A's death, the deed was delivered to
B, who apparently, had not paid the other sums of
money. Although B thus had the deed, he did not have
possession of the land, and brought ejectment for it
against A's other heirs. Apparently, the Court gave
1McMiflan v. Davis, 54 Super. 154.
"2Vorheis v. Kitch, 8 Phila. 544. But, the case shows that
relation was unnecessary. A had made a contract to sell land to
B, and he and his wife, executed the deed to B, which they depos-
ited with C, to hold until payment of the purchase money. A's
wife died, and he remarried. The second wife had no dower on
the land, as against B, not because of relation, but because B
had become owner in equity of the land prior to her marriage,
her husband having only a right to the purchase money.
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judgment for B, on condition that he pay the moneys
he had agreed to pay, except the bond. Livingston,
P. J., said to the jury, that if the deed had been delivered
to C with direction to hold it until A's death, and then
to deliver it to B, in such a case, a delivery actually made,
by C to B, after As death, "would relate back to its
(the deed's) date of execution, and make it equivalent
to a delivery by A at that time for ordinary purposes."
But the observation means nothing more than that the
delivery by C after A's death will have the same valid-
ity, as the delivery by A, during his life.23 A made a
deed to his wife, depositing it with the scrivener to hold
until A's death, and then to deliver it to the grantee.
After A's death, the deed was so delivered to her. In
an action by her against her vendee of the land for the
purchase money, Woodward, P. J., held her title to be
good, saying, "in general when an instrument is delivered
as an escrow to a third person to be delivered to the
grantee on a future event, it is not the deed of the gran-
tor until the second delivery; but this rule is subject to
exceptions, founded as it is said on necessity ut res
valeat." The Court finds no objection to the title of A's
wife, remarking, "either as a conveyance vesting the es-
tate at the delivery of the magistrate (the scrivener, a
justice of the peace) or as a testamentary disposition of
the property, this deed ought to be sustained."2' A
grandfather made deeds to his grand-children, deposited
them with A, whom he directed to deliver them after his
death. They were so delivered after his death. The
grand-children's title was held to be good. Read, J.,
quotes from Shaw, C. J., in O'Kelley v. O'Kelley, 8 Metc.
436, "If it was delivered by the grantor to any person in
28Gish v. Brown, 171 Pa. 479.
2ALevengood v. Bailey, 1 Woodw. 275. The conveyance was
grautuitous.
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his lifetime, to be delivered to the grantee, after his de-
cease, it was a good delivery, upon the happening of the
contingency, and relates back so as to divest the title of
the grantor by relation from the first delivery." The
grandfather was about to marry, and made the deeds,
in order to pass the land to the grand-children free from
any dower of the wife.25
Title Vests With First Delivery
The object of depositing the deed with the third
person may be, not to postpone the vesting of title, or
even of right to take possession of the land; but to em-
barrass and prevent the alienation of the premises by the
grantee, until the death of the grantor. A deed was
made by A to B and C (husband and wife and D and
B, two living children, and was deposited with X, to keep
till the grantor's death. A collateral agreement reserved
to the grantor certain rights on the land, not inconsisten)
with the grantees' taking possession, and stated that,
'the children, if any, which said Joseph Worley and his
wife Agnes (B and C) may yet beget in future shall
also be entitled to said farm." Possession of the land
was taken, when the deed was deposited, and the gran-
tees were to perform certain duties to the grantor. Af-
ter the grantor's death, partition proceedings were in-
stituted. Four children born after the deposit of the
deed, and before the grantor's death, claimed a coten-
ancy with the rest. The Court decided that only the
persons named on the deed, who were in existence when
2sStephens v. Huss, 54 Pa. 20. In Stephens v. Rinehart, 72
Pa. 434, C. J. Shaw is uqoted, to the effect that a deed delivered
as an escrow, to await the happening of some contingency, end
not the performance of some conditions "will not take effect as a
deed until the second delivery; but when thus delivered, It will
take effect by relation from the first delivery."
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it was deposited, had any interest in the premises. The
t-itle passed at that time or related back to that time.
Persons afterwards born, acquired nothing.
8
Revoking the Depositary's Authority
If the depositor of a deed in escrow, reserves the
right to withdraw it, he may probably, withdraw it, and
prevent the vesting of the title. But, the mere reserva-
tion of the right to withdraw the deed, will not prevent
the title from vesting, if no withdrawal is in fact made,
and the depositary delivers the deed, on the happening
of the event designated; e. g., the death of the grantor.27
In Ramlow v. Ramlow,28 a father aid mother executed
a deed to a son, and gave it to an attorney to hold until
their death. No consideration was paid or to be paid
by the son. The mother continued to occupy the prem-
ises and paid the taxes. Subsequently, the mother filed
a bill for the cancellation of the deed. The Court found
that the grantors were old, illiterate, Germans, who did
not understand English, had made the deed without ra-
ceiving advice, that they thought that they could with-
draw the deed at any time; that the intention was to
make a gift at their death, in case the deed was not can-
celled in their lifetimes. The son, who did not know of
the execution of the deed till after it had been deposited
with the third person, and put on record by him (con-
trary to the intention of the grantors) conceded that his
mother had a life estate in the land. The Court decreed
cancellation of the deed.
2eWerley v. Werley, 2 Leh. County Law J. 343.
27Stephens v. Huss, 54 Pa. 20; Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa.
434.
2856 Pittsb. 120 The bzurden was on the grantee to show
that the deed was irrevocable.
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A Vendees Grantee
A was entitled, under contract, to a conveyance of
houses from X. Before the conveyance, X died. A
petitioned the Orphans' Court to decree against X's exe-
cutors and devisees specific performance. The answer
of the defendants showed that A had directed the execu-
tors to make a conveyance of the houses to W, and that
they had made a deed to W, and had deposited it with
S. & C. for delivery to W. The Court refused the peti-
tion .29
Depositary's Tampering With Deed
A contract between A and B, entitled B to a con-
veyance of land from A. A and wife in possession thereof,
executed a deed to B and delivered it to N, to be delivered
by N to B upon B's paying the purchase money. Mean-
time B receives possession of the land and contracts for
the erection of a building thereon. N, the depositary,
without the authority of the grantors, or the grantee,
erased the name of the grantee, and substituted that
of Y. Y executed a deed for the land to R, who paid
the purchase money to the grantor, who had no knowl-
edge of the alteration of his deed. The Court refused
to recognize R as having any right to intervene in a sci.
fa. sur mechanic's lien, arising out of the building oper-
ation."
29Forder's Estate, 4 W. N. C. 128.
SoPace v. Yost, 10 KuIp. 538.
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MOOT COURT
WRIGHT v. MORSE
Contract-Infant's Liability-Ratification
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff sues for the price of a horse sold by him to the
defendant when he was but twenty years old. On his twenty-
first birthday, the defendant sold the horse at a profit of twen-
ty-five dollars. He at once spent the proceeds on a pleasure
trip. On his return he learned for the first time that he, in the
absence of a ratification, could have avoided liability for the
price.
Campbell, for the plaintiff.
Joblin, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JESELSOHN, J. It is a well known doctrine of the common
law that an infant's contracts are voidable at his option upon
his reaching majority. An exception to this well known rule is
when the articles supplied are necessaries. The question then
arises, what are necessaries? Lord Coke has said an infant's
necessaries are '"his necessary meat, drink, apparel, necessary
physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good
teaching or instruction, whereby he might profit himself after.
wards."
Was the horse necessary for the infant's subsistence in the
case at bar? It surely was not. If it was, why did he sell it
and use the proceeds for a pleasure trip? It is true that a
horse may be classed as a necessary in some cases, as for an in-
valid; but it may not be so termed when it is purely for pleas-
ure.
The general rule is that an infant cannot avoid his contracts
until he reaches majority. He lacks the legal discretion to do
the tact of avoidance. It is admitted that the defendant did not
have the legal discretion to avoid his contract, and for this reason
his sale of the horse is not considered a sufficient ratification.
It is a well known rule that an act of ratification must be
done understandingly. The act must elso show an intention, on
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the part of the one ratifying, to be thereby bound. Johnston v.
Farnier, 69 Pa. 449, holds that "to constitute a bihding ratifi-
cation of an infant's contract, such ratification must be made
with deliberate purpose of assuming a liability from which the
person knows himself to be discharged by law." The rule has
been stated in Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 460, as follows: "All
that is necessary is, that the infant expressly agree to ratify
his contract, not by doubtful acts, . but by words, oral or in
writing, which import a recognition and a confirmation of his
promise." The mere acknowledgment of a contract, without a
promise to be bound, expressed or implied, is not sufficient. Some
cases have gone so far as to say, that in order to sustain an ac-
tion against a person of full age on a promise made by him when
an infant, there must be express ratification, as by saying, "I
ratify and confirm," or, "I agree to pay the debt."
O urtin v. Patton, 11 S. and R. 305, holds: "To make a con-
tract, entered into by a minor, binding upon him when becoming
of age, it must appear, that after his arrival at full age, he con-
firmed the contract by some distinct act, with full knowledge
that it would be void without such confirmation." It was also
held in Hatch v. Hatch's Estate, 60 Vermont 170: "Where the
declaration or the acts of an individual, after becoming of age,
fairly and justly lead to the inference that he intended to and
did recognize and adopt as binding an agreement, executory on
his part, having been made during infancy, and intended to pay
the debt then incurred, we think it is sufficient to constitute
ratifioation; provided the declarations were freely and under-
standingly made, or the acts in like manner performed, and
with knowledge that he was not legally liable".
If Morse had intended to bind himself, he would not have
spent the money for his pleasure as soon as he sold the horse.
Since the facts show that the defendant was entirely unaware
of his non-liability and since the Pennsylvania doctrine c'early
is that he must be so aware, we give judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The purchase of the horse was voidable by the minor, upon
hiu attaining majority.
On his 21st birthday, he sold the horse. He was then an
adult, his birthday being the first day of his 22d year. 22d Cyc.
p. 512.
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Was the sale a ratification of the previous purchase? It
was an assertion of ownership, and that ownership, if it existed,
was the consequence of the previous purchase.
The former minor was ignorant when he sold the horse,
that he could have returned it and avoided payment of its price.
Does this ignorance make the sale not a ratification? There
are two cases in which an obligation assumed by an infant for
the accommodation of another was held capable of repudiation,
notwithstanding a ratifying act, in the absence of knowledge that
he. could repudiate the obligation. Curtin v. Patten, 11 S. and
It. 305. Hindy v. Margaritz, 3 Pa. 429. In this case the con-
tiact was not made for the accommodation of another. "The
better considered rule", says 22 Cyc. p. 603, "appears to be that
as the late infant must be presumed to know his legal rights,
it is not necessary to a ratification of his contract made during
infancy, that the act or promise relied on should have been done
or made with actual knowledge that he was not bound."
Morse retained the horse till he became 21 years old. He
then sold it at a profit of $25. It is abhorrent to say that he
does not need to pay for it. If he squandered the money, he did
so as an adult.
In Johnston v. Fournier, 69 Pa. 449, a partition was made
by the guardian of a minor. On his reaching age, the minor con-
veyed the land that had been 'allotted to him as his purport.
"What," asks Sharswood, J., "can be a more unequivocal and con-
clusive assent and ratification by an infant after majority of a
partition made by the guardian than a sale and conveyance of
the land allotted to him, clear of the encumbrance which would
have otherwise attached to it, reciting the very partition as valid
which he now claims to avoid?
When Morse sold the horse he warranted his title, that is,
he affirmed that it was his. We think he must pay for it.
Reversed with v. f. d. n.
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LORING v. RAILROAD COMPANY
Negligence-Railroad Crossing - Driver of Vehicle - Imputed
Negligence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff's wife was killed by the collision of a train on
defendant's road with an automobile in which she was riding as
an invited guest. The automobile stalled on a sharp hill just
across the crossing and the road being too narrow to permit turn-
ing, the driver was compelled to back across defendant's doub.e
tiacked road. The car -was struck on the second track. The
whistle was not blown nor the bell rung for the crossing.
Loftus, for plaintiff.
Jester, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GOLDBERG, J. After a careful consideration of the facts
of the case at bar, we find that two questions present themselves.
First, if the driver of the vehicle was negligent, would his neg-
ligence be attributed to the wife of the plaintiff, and thus bar
a recovery? Second, whether any negligence whatever can be
imputed to the driver, the facts of the case not showing whether
he stopped, looked and listened?
As a general rule the rights and duties of the pub.ic and a
railroad company at a public crossing are mutual and reciprocal,
and both are charged with the mutual duty of keeping a careful
lookout to avoid inflicting or receiving an injury; the degree of
diligence to be used on either side being such as a prudent person
would exercise under the circumstances at the par-
ticular time. A traveler is bound to use ordinary
care in approaching a crossing and observing the
approach of trains. The railroad company riust use care
in giving proper and timely warning of the approach of such
trains. 33 Cyc. 923.
There is no question as to the negligence of the railroad
company in this case, since the train approached a public cross-
ing and failed to blow the whistle or ring the bell. The Lacts do
not show that the driver stopped the car before backing across
the tracks, or that he was on the lookout for approaching trains.
But, supposing he was negligent in failing to do what the law re-
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quires, can we attribute his negligence to an invited guest, who
had no control over him?
In 7 Am. and Eng. Ency. 446-447, it is said that where
the question is whether the person inured is chargeable with the
contributory negligence of a driver or person with whom he was
riding as a guest by special invitation, there has been, and still
is, much conflict among the authorities; but the true principle
seems to be that when a person is injured by the negligence of the
defendant and the contributory negligence of the one with whom
the injured person is riding as a guest or companion, such neg-
ligence is not imputable to the injured person. The Pennsylva-
nia authorities there cited are: Borough of Carlis.e v. Brisbane,
113 Pa. 544; Dean v. Pa. R. R. Co., 129 Pa. 514; Carr v. Easton
City, 142 Pa. 139.
Though there are some decisions to the contrary, the great
weight of authority, including that of the courts of Pennsylvania,
is to the effect that the negligence of the driver of a private con-
veyance will not be imputed to a person riding with him and who
has no authority or control over him. 29 Cyc. 549; Little v. Tele-
graph Co., 213 Pa. 229; Jones v. R. R. Co., 202 Pa. 81; Finnegan
v. Foster Township, 163 Pa. 135.
What possible negligence could we attribute to this invited
guest? What control had she over the driver? Surely, he knew
that he had just crossed a railroad crossing, and also knew when
his machine stalled that he was going to back down over the
crossing. Was it the guest's duty to call his attention to the
fact that he was going to cross a crossing? Supposing she
did call this to his attention, would that free her from all negli-
gence on her part? What more could she possibly have done?
Supposing she had done the above, and still the driver failed to
heed her warning, would it be her duty to leap from the ma-
chine in order to be free from negligence? We think not. It
was not her duty to call his attention to the fact that the railroad
crossing was so near, as the facts clearly state they had just
passed over the crossing, and surely the driver knew that it was
not very far away.
In the case of Jones v. R. R. Co., 202 Pa. 81, an omnibus
drawn by four horses and containing more than twenty people
reached the crossing of the defendant's rao3d as a train approach-
ed it. A collision ensued in which eight of the passengers were
killed and as many more injured. The driver exercised no care
whatever to avoid danger. The court held that the negligence
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of the driver of the omnibus could not be imputed to the passen-
gers.
The case at bar is in every respect similar to the case of
Robinson v. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 11, where a woman accepted an
invitation to ride in a buggy with a person who was entirely com-
petent to manage the horse. It was held that if the defendant
company was negligent and the plaintiff free from negligence
herself, she might recover from the company although the driver
of the buggy might have been guilty of negligence which contri-
buted to the injury.
There was no evidence whatever in the case at bar that Mrs.
Loring knew that the driver was reckless and unskillful, or that
she saw, or by the exercise of reasonable care at the time could
have seen the danger when backing down the hill, as there was
no warning of en approaching train.
In Mann v. Weiand, 81% Pa. 243, it was held that the negli-
gence of the driver of a private vehicle could not be imputed to a
companion riding with him, who has no control or authority over
the driver or his team, in case such companion is injured in a
runaway of the horses frightened by the attacks of vicious dogs
belonging to a third person. This doctrine was followed in
Walsh v. Altoona and L. V. E. Ry. Co., 232 Pa. 484.
As to the negligence of the driver the facts make no com-
ment, and there is no evidence to show whether he stopped,
looked and listened before attempting to cross the tracks. The
law is well settled that where there is no evidence to show that
a person did or did not do his duty before crossing, viz., stop,
look and listen, the presumption is that he exercised all the nec-
essary care. 7 Am. and Eng. Ency. 439; P. R. R. Co. v. Weber,
76 Pa. 157. It is also settled that where there is no evidence
showing that the railroad company has been negligent in any way,
that it too is entitled to the presumption that it has done its
duty. Terry v. D. L. and W. R. R. Co., 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 455;
Hanna v. P. and R. Ry. Co., 213 Pa. 157. But the case at bar
clearly shows that the railroad company was negligent in failing
to give proper warning of the approaching train, and hence is not
entitled to the presumption of having exercised proper care. On
the other hand-, there is no evidence to show that the driver was
negligent; therefore he is presumed to have exercised due care.
In view of the above decisions, we render a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.
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OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Let us suppose that the accident would not have occurred but
for the negligence of the driver of the automobile. Would such
negligence prevent a recovery, were the action brought by Mrs.
Loring? The cases quoted abundantly by the learned court be-
low show that it would not. The driver's negligence is not imputed
to the invited guest.
Was Mrs. Loring herself negligent? It does not appear that
she did or omitted to do something which care dictated the do-
ing or omitting of but for the doing or omission of which the
collision would not have occurred.
But can one assume that the driver was negligent? Neg-
ligence is not assumed without proof. In the absence of evidence,
we must postulate that the driver stopped, looked and listened,
before he backed upon the track. We must further assume that
he neither saw nor heard the approaching train, on looking and
listening.
The train gave no usual signal of its approach. The bell
did not r'n, the whistle was not blown. No description of the
track, of the con our of the country, is given, from which it
might be inferred that the bell and whistle would; not have been
heard, if they had been sounded in time to avert the collision.
The jury then was justified in thinking that the failure to ring
and whistle was the cause of the accident. The omission to ring
and whistle was negligent. The defendant, then by its negligence,
caused the collision. The decision of the learned court below must
be affirmed. Affirmed.
ESTATE OF HARRIMAN
Wills-Charitable Gifts-Effect of Later Will-Act of April 26,
1855 P. L. 328
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harriman made a wil January 7, 1914, in which he gave
three legacies to charities. This will was attested by credible
witnesses. On June 5, 1916, he made another will, wherein he
expressed the purpose to revoke the first will. He however re-
peated the same legacies. This will had two attesting witnesses.
Harriman died on June 27, 1916. The three legatees claim the
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legacies. The court decided that the legacies are void. Appeal
by legatees.
Van Scoyec, for the appellant.
Goldberg, for the appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DE RENZO, J. The Act of Assembly, April 26, 1855, P. L.
328, P. end L. Dig. 937 provides: "'No estate, real or personal.
shall hereafter be bequeathed, devised or conveyed to any body
politic or to any person in trust for religious or charitable uses,
except the same be done by deed or will, attested by two credible,
and at the same time disinterested witnesses, at least one calen-
dar month before the decease of the testator or alienor, and all
dispositions of property contrary hereto, shall be void and go to
the residuary legatee or devisee, next kin or heirs, according to
law: provided, that any disposition of property within said
period, bona fide made, for a fair and valuable consideration,
shall not be hereby avoided"
In the case at bar, the testator by will, made valid devises
to three charities, then subsequently revoked the said will, and
in its place made a will which in itself was valid, being duly at-
tested. The question therefore arises whether a charity which
has been named as beneficiary under a will continues to be such
by the incorporation in a subsequent will of the same provisiona
as in the former will. In other words, when a subsequent will
repeats provisions of a former will, is the whole of the former
will revoked by such subsequent will, because the testator has
indicated the intention that the former be revoked by the making
of the subsequent will? (If the former will is not revoked as
to those provisions which were repeated in the subsequent will,
the Act of April 26, 1855, supra, will not apply.
The Pennsylvania cases indicate that wills may be impliedly
or expressly revoked. Price v. 'Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23, holds that
when two wills are in some respects inconsistent, the latter re-
vokes the former only in so far as they are inconsistent with
each other, un'.ess there is an express clause of revocation. It
is indicated in that case that where different executors are ap-
pointed in the second will, the inconsistency is such as will bring
the case within the operation of the Act of 1855, supra. This
view was adopted in Teacle's Estate, 153 Pa. 219. While
in the present case there is no indication that new executors
were appointed, yet the facts state that on June 5, 1916, he made
another will wherein he expressed the purpose to revoke the
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first will. We therefore adopt the view that he expressly re-
voked the first will instead of putting the case on the ground of
an implied revocation, as in the case of Price v. Maxwell, supra.
This case is to be distinguished from Hamilton's Estate, '74
Pa. 69, a case wherein the testator executed a codicil to the ef-
fect that should he die within a calendar month from the time of
execution of the later will., then the former will should govern
the bequest to charities. The court accordingly held in carry-
ing out the expressed intention of the testator that his wish
should govern, and the charity prevailed. Appeal of Carl, 106
Pa. 635, holds that a testator may, by a codicil executed within
a calendar month before his death, diminish the bequest to a
charity without avoiding the bequest altogether. On the other
hand it was held in Lightner's Appeal, 57 Super. Court 469,
that a testator could not, by a codicil executed within a calendar
month before his death, increase a bequest to the charity, but that
the charity should receive the same as provided by the will it-
self. This case is easily distinguished from Manners v. Phila-
de'phia Library Co., 93 Pa. 165, a leading case in Pennsylvania.
Dr. Rush made a devise to a charity and provided in his will for
the furnishing of books of an atheistical tendency in the library.
The heirs contended that a devise for an immoral purpose and
one contrary to the laws and sentiments of Pennsylvania must
fail. Also that the library could not claim, as residuary devisee,
property acquired subsequently to the limit provided by the Act
of 1855, supra. viz., within a calendar month of his decease. Jus-
tice Paxson delivered the opinion of the court, wherein he took
the view that the words used by Dr. Rush, as to the books of an
atheistical or infidel tendency, were merely directory and not
mandatory, and that the funds could be ,applied according to the
doctrine of cy pres. He further held that the Library Co., as
residuary devisee of the land, could properly lay claim to the land,
acquired by Dr. Rush during the last month of his life, and that
the view was not in conflict with the Act of 1855 supra, inasmuch
as no instrument was necessary to limit the property to the
charity. In Lightner's Appeal, supra, the charity claimed by vir-
tue of an instrument executed during the last month of the testa-
tor's life. In this connection see Appeal of Carl, 106 Pa. 635.
In Sloan's Appeal, 168 Pa. 422, where a codicil executed with-
in a calendar month of the decease of the testator did not revoke
the devise to the charity, the testator in the codicil said he was
revoking and annulling the bequest, but in reality the full inten-
tion as gathered from the four corners of the instrument wag
merely to postpone the time that the qther charity was to take
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the bequest. It was the testator's intention all the way through
that the charity should ultimately take this bequest. In reason
we are of the opinion that we could follow Sloan's Appeal, supra,
and say that here it wtas the testator's intention all the way
through that the charities should get the legacies provided by
the testator. But we do not feel that we would be fortified by
authority in applying the rule of Sloan's Appeal, supra, to this
case. A codicil is an addition to a will and revokes it pro tanto.
A later will is of as great force as the original will; where the
testator expressly revokes the former then the two cannot be
read together.
Gregg's Estate, 213 Pa. 260, shows how far the courts go in
construing strictly the Act of 1855, supra. There it lacked from
two to five hours of being ,a full month from the time of making
the will until the testator died, with the consequent result that
the charity could not gain the bequest.
There is no ,doubt in the mind of this court but that the
manifest intentions of testators are very often defeated because
of the operation of an Act of Assembly, but it is a principle in
the law of wills that the intention of the testator is not to be
looked at alone but whether he has expressed his intention in a
valid manner. Here the testator complied with the statute in
the execution of his will, but because of a iubsequent event, his
desire cannot be made operative by the courts in the face of a
rule made by the Legislature which sets a mandatory rule of law
before us, and leaves nothing for the discretion of the courc.
Appeal dismissed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
For two years and a half, prior to his death, the testator
has expressed in the form of a will, his intention to bestow cer-
tain of his property upon three charities. The object of the
Act of 1855, in requiring that the will bestowing charitable gift3
should be made a calendar month before death, was, to prevent
testamentary dispositions occasioned by the feebleness of mind
and body, which frequently precedes death; and by the importun-
ities of ghostly persons who so frequently operate on religious
minds in their last days and weeks.
Had the first will not been repealed, the three charities
would have received the bequests mentioned in it. While the
testator in his second will declares that he revokes the earlier,
he shows quite plainly that he revokes only parts of the earlier.
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The charitable bequests are repeated exactly as they stand in the
earlier will.
We should be strongly disposed to hold that the revocation
of the bequests if they have in fact been revoked, was what is
sometimes called a "dependent relative revocation." Page, Wills,
p. 307. The testator revoked the legacies but on the assump-
tion that the repetition of them would be effectual. If that sup-
position was inaccurate, the revocation did not operate.
Nevertheless, we feel constrained to submit to what seems
coercive authority, and, therefore the appeal is dismissed.
